We consider the two-fold problem of representing collective beliefs and aggregating these beliefs. We propose modular, transitive relations for collective beliefs. They allow us to represent conflicting opinions and they have a clear semantics. We compare them with the quasi-transitive relations often used in Social Choice. Then, we describe a way to construct the belief state of an agent informed by a set of sources of varying degrees of reliability. This construction circumvents Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in a satisfactory manner. Finally, we give a simple settheory-based operator for combining the information of multiple agents. We show that this operator satisfies the desirable invariants of idempotence, commutativity, and associativity, and, thus, is well-behaved when iterated, and we describe a computationally effective way of computing the resulting belief state.
Introduction
We are interested in the multi-agent setting where agents are informed by sources of varying levels of reliability, and where agents can iteratively combine their belief states. This setting introduces three problems: (1) Finding an appropriate representation for collective beliefs; (2) Constructing an agent's belief state by aggregating the information from informant sources, accounting for the relative reliability of these sources; and, (3) Combining the information of multiple agents in a manner that is well-behaved under iteration.
The Social Choice community has dealt extensively with the first problem (although in the context of representing collective preferences rather than beliefs) (cf. (Sen 1986) ). The classical approach has been to use quasi-transitive relations (of which total pre-orders are a special subclass) over the set of possible worlds. However, these relations do not distinguish between group indifference and group conflict, and this distinction can be crucial. Consider, for example, a situation in which all members of a group are indifferent between movie a and movie b. If some passerby expresses a preference for a, the group may very well choose to adopt this opinion for the group and borrow a. However, if the group was already divided over the relative merits of a and b, we would be wise to hesitate before choosing one over the other just because a new supporter of a appears on the scene. We propose a representation in which the distinction is explicit. We also argue that our representation solves some of the unpleasant semantical problems suffered by the earlier approach.
The second problem addresses how an agent should actually go about combining the information received from a set of sources to create a belief state. Such a mechanism should favor the opinions held by more reliable sources, yet allow less reliable sources to voice opinions when higher ranked sources have no opinion. True, under some circumstances it would not be advisable for an opinion from a less reliable source to override the agnosticism of a more reliable source, but often it is better to accept these opinions as default assumptions until better information is available. (Maynard-Reid II and Shoham 2000) provides a solution to this problem when belief states are represented as total pre-orders, but runs into Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1963) when there are sources of equal reliability. As we shall see, the generalized representation allows us to circumvent this limitation.
To motivate the third problem, consider the following dynamic scenario: A robot controlling a ship in space receives from a number of communication centers on Earth information about the status of its environment and tasks. Each center receives information from a group of sources of varying credibility or accuracy (e.g., nearby satellites and experts) and aggregates it. Timeliness of decision-making in space is often crucial, so we do not want the robot to have to wait while each center sends its information to some central location for it to be first combined before being forwarded to the robot. Instead, each center sends its aggregated information directly to the robot. Not only does this scheme reduce dead time, it also allows for "anytime" behavior on the robot's part: the robot incorporates new information as it arrives and makes the best decisions it can with whatever information it has at any given point. This distributed approach is also more robust since the degradation in performance is much more graceful should information from individual centers get lost or delayed.
In such a scenario, the robot needs a mechanism for combining or fusing the belief states of multiple agents potentially arriving at different times. Moreover, the belief state output by the mechanism should be invariant with respect to the order of agent arrivals. We will describe such a mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows: After some preliminary definitions and a discussion of the approach to aggregation taken in classical Social Choice, we introduce modular, transitive relations for representing generalized belief states. We then describe how to construct the belief state of an agent given the belief states of its informant sources when these sources are totally pre-ordered. Finally, we describe a simple set-theory-based operator for fusing agent belief states that satisfies the desirable invariants of idempotence, commutativity, and associativity, and we describe a computationally effective way of computing this belief state.
Preliminaries
We begin by defining various well-known properties of binary relations 1 ; they will be useful to us throughout the paper.
Definition 1 Suppose ≤ is a relation over a finite set Ω, i.e., ≤⊆ Ω × Ω. We shall use x ≤ y to denote (x, y) ∈≤ and x ≤ y to denote (x, y) ∈≤. The relation ≤ is:
1. reflexive iff x ≤ x for x ∈ Ω. It is irreflexive iff x ≤ x for x ∈ Ω.
2. symmetric iff x ≤ y ⇒ y ≤ x for x, y ∈ Ω. It is asymmetric iff x ≤ y ⇒ y ≤ x for x, y ∈ Ω. It is anti-symmetric iff x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x ⇒ x = y for x, y ∈ Ω.
3. the strict version of a relation ≤ ′ over Ω iff x ≤ y ⇔ x ≤ ′ y ∧ y ≤ ′ x for x, y ∈ Ω.
4. total iff x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x for x, y ∈ Ω.
modular iff
7. quasi-transitive iff its strict version is transitive.
the transitive closure of a relation
9. acyclic iff ∀w 0 , . . . , w n ∈ Ω. w 0 < · · · < w n implies w n < w 0 for all integers n, where < is the strict version of ≤.
Now, every acyclic relation defines a choice function, one which assigns to each subset its choice set:
Proposition 2 (Sen 1986) Given a relation ≤ over a finite set Ω, the choice set operation C defines a choice function iff ≤ is acyclic.
2
If a relation is not acyclic, elements involved in a cycle are said to be in a conflict because we cannot order them:
Definition 4 Given a relation < over a finite set Ω, x and y are in a conflict wrt < iff there exist w 0 , . . . , w n , z 0 , . . . , z m ∈ Ω such that x = w 0 < · · · < w n = y = z 0 < · · · < z m = x, where x, y ∈ Ω.
Aggregation in Social Choice
We are interested in belief aggregation, but the community historically most interested in aggregation has been that of Social Choice theory. The aggregation is over preferences rather than beliefs, so the discussion in this subsection will focus on representing preferences; however, as we shall see, the results are equally relevant to representing beliefs. In the Social Choice community, the standard representation of an agent's preferences is a total pre-order. Each total pre-order i is interpreted as describing the weak preferences of an individual i, so that x i y means i considers alternative x to be at least as preferable as alternative y.
3 If x i y and y i x, then i is indifferent between x and y.
Unfortunately, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1963) showed that no aggregation operator over total pre-orders exists satisfying the following small set of desirable properties:
Definition 5 Let f be an aggregation operator over the preferences 1 , . . . , n of n individuals, respectively, over a finite set of alternatives Ω, and let = f ( 1 , . . . , n ).
• Restricted Range: The range of f is the set of total pre-orders over Ω.
• Unrestricted Domain: The domain of f is the set of n-tuples of total pre-orders over Ω.
• Pareto Principle: If x ≺ i y for all i, then x ≺ y.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA):
• Non-Dictatorship: There is no individual i such that, for every tuple in the domain of f and every x, y ∈ Ω, x ≺ i y implies x ≺ y. This impossibility theorem led researchers to look for weakenings to Arrow's framework that would circumvent the result. One was to weaken the restricted range condition, requiring that the result of an aggregation only satisfy totality and quasi-transitivity rather than the full transitivity of a total pre-order. This weakening was sufficient to guarantee the existence of an aggregation function satisfying the other conditions, while still producing relations that defined choice functions (Sen 1986). However, this solution was not without its own problems.
First, total, quasi-transitive relations have unsatisfactory semantics. If is total and quasi-transitive but not a total pre-order, its indifference relation is not transitive:
Proposition 4 Let be a relation over a finite set Ω and let ∼ be its symmetric restriction (i.e., x ∼ y iff x y and y x). If is total and quasi-transitive but not transitive, then ∼ is not transitive.
There has been much discussion as to whether or not indifference should be transitive; in many cases one feels indifference should be transitive. If Deb enjoys plums and mangoes equally and also enjoys mangoes and peaches equally, we would conclude that she also enjoys plums and peaches equally. It seems that total quasi-transitive relations that are not total pre-orders cannot be understood easily as preference or indifference.
Since the existence of a choice function is generally sufficient for classical Social Choice problems, this issue was at least ignorable. However, in iterated aggregation, the result of the aggregation must not only be usable for making decisions, but must be interpretable as a new preference relation that may be involved in later aggregations; consequently, it must maintain clean semantics.
Secondly, the totality assumption is excessively restrictive for representing aggregate preferences. In general, a binary relation can express four possible relationships between a pair of alternatives a and b: a b and b a, b a and a b, a b and b a, and a b and b a. Totality reduces this set to the first three which, under the interpretation of relations as representing weak preference, correspond to the two strict orderings of a and b, and indifference. However, consider the situation where a couple is trying to choose between an Italian and an Indian restaurant, but one strictly prefers Italian food to Indian food, whereas the second strictly prefers Indian to Italian. The couple's opinions are in conflict, a situation that does not fit into any of the three remaining categories. Thus, the totality assumption is essentially an assumption that conflicts do not exist. This, one may argue, is appropriate if we want to represent preferences of one agent (but see (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) for persuasive arguments that individuals are often ambivalent). However, the assumption is inappropriate if we want to represent aggregate preferences since individuals will almost certainly have differences of opinion.
Generalized Belief States
Let us turn to the domain of belief aggregation. A total pre-order over the set of possible worlds is a fairly well-accepted representation for a belief state in the belief revision community (Grove 1988; Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991; Lehmann and Magidor 1992; Gärdenfors and Makinson 1994) . Instead of preference, relations represent relative likelihood, instead of indifference, equal likelihood. For the remainder of the paper, assume we are given some language L with a satisfaction relation |= for L. Let W be a finite, nonempty set of possible worlds (interpretations) over L. Suppose is a total pre-order on W. The belief revision literature maintains that the conditional belief "if p then q" (where p and q are sentences in L) holds if all the worlds in the choice set of those satisfying p also satisfy q; we write Bel(p?q). The individual's unconditional beliefs are all those where p is the sentence true. If neither the belief p?q nor its negation hold in the belief state, it is said to be agnostic with respect to p?q, written Agn(p?q).
It should come as no surprise that belief aggregation is formally similar to preference aggregation and, as a result, is also susceptible to the problems described in the previous section. We propose a solution to these problems which generalizes the total pre-order representation so as to capture information about conflicts.
Modular, transitive states
We take strict likelihood as primitive. Since strict likelihood is not necessarily total, it is possible to represent agnosticism and conflicting opinions in the same structure. This choice deviates from that of most authors, but are similar to those of Kreps (Kreps 1990, p. 19) who is interested in representing both indifference and incomparability. Unlike Kreps, rather than use an asymmetric relation to represent strict likelihood (e.g., the strict version of a weak likelihood relation), we impose the less restrictive condition of modularity.
We formally define generalized belief states: We interpret a ≺ b to mean "there is reason to consider a as strictly more likely than b." We represent equal likelihood, which we also refer to as "agnosticism," with the relationship ∼ defined such that x ∼ y if and only if x ≺ y and y ≺ x. We define the conflict relation corresponding to ≺, denoted ∞, so that x∞y iff x ≺ y and y ≺ x. It describes situations where there are reasons to consider either of a pair of worlds as strictly more likely than the other. In fact, one can easily check that ∞ precisely represents conflicts in a belief state in the sense of Definition 4.
For convenience, we will refer to generalized belief states simply as belief states for the remainder of the paper except when to do so would cause confusion.
Discussion
Let us consider why our choice of representation is justified. First, we agree with the Social Choice community that strict likelihood should be transitive.
As we discussed in the previous section, there is often no compelling reason why agnosticism/indifference should not be transitive; we also adopt this view. However, transitivity of strict likelihood by itself does not guarantee transitivity of agnosticism. A simple example is the following: ≺= {(a, c)}, so that ∼= {(a, b), (b, c)}. However, if we buy that strict likelihood should be transitive, then agnosticism is transitive identically when strict likelihood is also modular:
In summary, transitivity and modularity are necessary if strict likelihood and agnosticism are both required to be transitive.
We should point out that conflicts are also transitive in our framework. At first glance, this may appear undesirable: it is entirely possible for a group to disagree on the relative likelihood of worlds a and b, and b and c, yet agree that a is more likely than c. However, we note that this transitivity follows from the cycle-based definition of conflicts (Definition 4), not from our belief state representation. It highlights the fact that we are not only concerned with conflicts that arise from simple disagreements over pairs of alternatives, but those that can be inferred from a series of inconsistent opinions as well. Now, to argue that modular, transitive relations are sufficient to capture relative likelihood, agnosticism, and conflicts among a group of information sources, we first point out that adding irreflexivity would give us the class of relations that are strict versions of total pre-orders, i.e., conflict-free. Let T be the set of total pre-orders over W, T < , the set of their strict versions.
Proposition 6 The set of irreflexive relations in B is isomorphic to T and, in fact, equals T < .
Secondly, the following representation theorem shows that each belief state partitions the possible worlds into sets of worlds either all equally likely or all potentially involved in a conflict, and totally orders these sets; worlds in distinct sets have the same relation to each other as do the sets.
Proposition 7 ≺∈ B iff there is a partition
W = W 0 , . . . , W n of W such that: 1. For every x ∈ W i and y ∈ W j , i = j implies i < j iff x ≺ y.
Every W i is either fully connected (w
Figure 1 shows three examples of belief states: one which is a total pre-order, one which is the strict version of a total pre-order, and one which is neither.
Thus, generalized belief states are not a big change from the strict versions of total pre-orders. They merely generalize these by weakening the assumption that sets of worlds not strictly ordered are equally likely, allowing for the possibility of conflicts. Now we can distinguish between agnostic and conflicting conditional beliefs. A belief state ≺ is agnostic about ′ for every w in the head circle and w ′ in the tail circle; no arc indicates that w ≺ w ′ for each of these pairs. In particular, the set of worlds represented by a circle is fully connected if there is an arc from the circle to itself, fully disconnected otherwise.) conditional belief p?q (i.e., Agn(p?q)) if the choice set of worlds satisfying p contains both worlds which satisfy q and ¬q and is fully disconnected. It is in conflict about this belief, written Con(p?q), if the choice set is fully connected.
Finally, we compare the representational power of our definitions to those discussed in the previous section. First, B subsumes the class of total pre-orders:
Proposition 8 T ⊂ B and is the set of reflexive relations in B.
Secondly, B neither subsumes nor is subsumed by the set of total, quasi-transitive relations, and the intersection of the two classes is T . Let Q be the set of total, quasi-transitive relations over W, and Q < , the set of their strict versions.
Proposition 9
1. Q ∩ B = T .
B ⊆ Q.
3. Q ⊆ B if W has at least three elements.
Q ⊂ B if W has one or two elements.
Because modular, transitive relations represent strict preferences, it is probably fairer to compare them to the class of strict versions of total, quasi-transitive relations. Again, neither class subsumes the other, but this time the intersection is T < :
3. Q < ⊆ B if W has at least three elements.
Q < ⊂ B if W has one or two elements.
In the next section, we define a natural aggregation policy based on this new representation that admits clear semantics and obeys appropriately modified versions of Arrow's conditions.
Single-agent belief state construction
Suppose an agent is informed by a set of sources, each with its individual belief state. Suppose further that the agent has ranked the sources by level of credibility.
We propose an operator for constructing the agent's belief state ≺ by aggregating the belief states of the sources in S while accounting for the credibility ranking of the sources. Let us begin the formal development by defining sources:
Definition 7 S is a finite set of sources. With each source s ∈ S is associated a belief state < s ∈ B.
We denote the agnosticism and conflict relations of a source s by ≈ s and ⊲⊳ s , respectively. It is possible to assume that the belief state of a source is conflict free, i.e., acyclic. However, this is not necessary if we allow sources to suffer from the human malady of "being torn between possibilities."
We assume that the agent's credibility ranking over the sources is a total pre-order:
Definition 8 R is a totally ordered finite set of ranks.
Definition 9 rank : S → R assigns to each source a rank.
Definition 10 ⊒ is the total pre-order over S induced by the ordering over R. That is,
we say s ′ is as credible as s. ⊒ S is the restriction of ⊒ to S ⊆ S.
We use = and ≡ to denote the asymmetric and symmetric restrictions of ⊒, respectively. 4 The finiteness of S (R) ensures that a maximal source (rank) always exists, which is necessary for some of our results. Weaker assumptions are possible, but at the price of unnecessarily complicating the discussion.
We are ready to consider the source aggregation problem. In the following, assume an agent is informed by a set of sources S ⊆ S. We look at two special casesequal-ranked and strictly-ranked source aggregationbefore considering the general case.
Equal-ranked sources aggregation
Suppose all the sources have the same rank so that ⊒ S is fully connected. Intuitively, we want take all offered opinions seriously, so we take the union of the relations:
By simply taking the union of the source belief states, we may lose transitivity. However, we do not lose modularity:
Proposition 11 If S ⊆ S, then U n(S) is modular but not necessarily transitive.
Thus, we know from Proposition 1 that we need only take the transitive closure of U n(S) to get a belief state:
Not surprisingly, by taking all opinions of all sources seriously, we may generate many conflicts, manifested as fully connected subsets of W.
Example 2 Suppose all three sources in the space robot scenario of Example 1 are considered equally credible, then the aggregate belief state will be the fully connected relation indicating that there are conflicts over every belief.
Strictly-ranked sources aggregation
Next, consider the case where the sources are strictly ranked, i.e., ⊒ S is a total order. We define an operator such that lower-ranked sources refine the belief states of higher ranked sources. That is, in determining the ordering of a pair of worlds, the opinions of higherranked sources generally override those of lower-ranked sources, and lower-ranked sources are consulted when higher-ranked sources are agnostic:
The definition of the AGRRf operator does not rely on ⊒ S being a total order, and we will use it in this more general setting in the following sub-section. However, in the case that ⊒ S is a total order, the result of applying AGRRf is guaranteed to be a belief state.
Proposition 13 If S ⊆ S and ⊒ S is a total order, then AGRRf (S) ∈ B. Note that this case of strictly-ranked sources is almost exactly that considered in (Maynard-Reid II and Shoham 2000) , except that the authors are not able to allow for conflicts in belief states. A surprising result they show is that standard AGM belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985) can be modeled as the aggregation of two sources, the informant and the informee, where the informant is considered more credible than the informee.
General aggregation
In the general case, we may have several ranks represented and multiple sources of each rank. It will be instructive to first consider the following seemingly natural strawman operator, AGR * : First combine equi-rank sources using AGRU n, then aggregate the strictly-ranked results using what is essentially AGRRf :
For any r ∈ R, let < r = AGRU n({s ∈ S : rank(s) = r}) and ≈ r ′ , the corresponding agnosticism relation. Also, let rank(S) = {r ∈ R : ∃s ∈ S. rank(s) = r}. AGR * (S) is the relation
∃r ∈ R. x < r y∧ (∀r ′ > r ∈ ranks(S). x ≈ r ′ y) AGR * indeed defines a legitimate belief state:
Unfortunately, a problem with this "divide-andconquer" approach is it assumes the result of aggregation is independent of potential interactions between the individual sources of different ranks. Consequently, opinions that will eventually get overridden may still have an indirect effect on the final aggregation result by introducing superfluous opinions during the intermediate equi-rank aggregation step, as the following example shows:
All sources are agnostic over a and c, yet (a, c) and (c, a) are in the result because of the transitive closure in the lower rank involving opinions ((b, c) and (b, a)) which actually get overridden in the final result.
Because of these undesired effects, we propose another aggregation operator which circumvents this problem by applying refinement (as defined in Definition 13) to the set of source belief states before infering new opinions via closure:
Definition 15 The rank-based aggregation of a set of sources S ⊆ S is AGR(S) = AGRRf (S) + .
Encouragingly, AGR outputs a valid belief state: We observe that AGR, when applied to the set of sources in Example 4, does indeed bypass the problem described above of extraneous opinion introduction:
Example 6 Assume W, S, and ⊒ are as in Example 4.
We also observe that AGR behaves well in the special cases we've considered, reducing to AGRU n when all sources have equal rank, and to AGRRf when the sources are totally ranked:
Proposition 16 Suppose S ⊆ S.
If ⊒ S is fully connected, AGR(S) = AGRU n(S).
2. If ⊒ S is a total order, AGR(S) = AGRRf (S).
Arrow, revisited
Finally, a strong argument in favor of AGR is that it satisfies appropriate modifications of Arrow's conditions. Let f be an operator which aggregates the belief states < s1 , . . . , < sn over W of n sources s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ S, respectively, and let ≺ = f (< s1 , . . . , < sn ). We consider each condition separately.
Restricted range The output of the aggregation function will be a modular, transitive belief state rather than a total pre-order. Unrestricted domain Similarly, the input to the aggregation function will be modular, transitive belief states of sources rather than total pre-orders.
Definition 17 (modified) Unrestricted Domain: For each i, < si can be any member of B.
Pareto principle Generalized belief states already represent strict likelihood. Consequently, we use the actual input and output relations of the aggregation function in place of their strict versions to define the Pareto principle. Obviously, because we allow for the introduction of conflicts, AGR will not satisfy the original formal Pareto principle which essentially states that if all sources have an unconflicted belief that one world is strictly more likely than another, this must also be true of the aggregated belief state. Neither condition is necessarily stronger than the other.
Definition 18 (modified) Pareto Principle:
Independence of irrelevant alternatives Conflicts are defined in terms of cycles, not necessarily binary. By allowing the existence of conflicts, we effectively have made it possible for outside worlds to affect the relation between a pair of worlds, viz., by involving them in a cycle. As a result, we need to weaken IIA to say that the relation between worlds should be independent of other worlds unless these other worlds put them in conflict.
Non-dictatorship As with the Pareto principle definition, we use the actual input and output relations to define non-dictatorship since belief states represent strict likelihood. From this perspective, our setting requires that informant sources of the highest rank be "dictators" in the sense considered by Arrow. However, the setting originally considered by Arrow was one where all individuals are ranked equally. Thus, we make this explicit in our new definition of non-dictatorship by adding the pre-condition that all sources be of equal rank. Now, AGR treats a set of equi-rank sources equally by taking all their opinions seriously, at the price of introducing conflicts. So, intuitively, there are no dictators. However, because Arrow did not account for conflicts in his formulation, all the sources will be "dictators" by his definition. We need to modify the definition of non-dictatorship to say that no source can always push opinions through without them ever being contested.
Definition 20 (modified) Non-Dictatorship: If s i ≡ s j for all i, j, then there is no i such that, for every combination of source belief states and every x, y ∈ W, x < si y and y < si x implies x ≺ y and y ≺ x.
We now show that AGR indeed satisfies these conditions:
S). AGR f satisfies (the modified versions of ) restricted range, unrestricted domain, Pareto principle, IIA, and non-dictatorship.

Multi-agent fusion
So far, we have only considered the case where a single agent must construct or update her belief state once informed by a set of sources. Multi-agent fusion is the process of aggregating the belief states of a set of agents, each with its respective set of informant sources. We proceed to formalize this setting.
An agent A is informed by a set of sources S ⊆ S. Agent A's induced belief state is the belief state formed by aggregating the belief states of its informant sources, i.e., AGR(S). Assume the set of agents to fuse agree upon rank (and, consequently, ⊒).
5 We define the fusion of this set to be an agent informed by the combination of informant sources:
Not surprisingly given its set-theoretic definition, fusion is idempotent, commutative, and associative. These properties guarantee the invariance required in multi-agent belief aggregation applications such as our space robot domain.
In the multi-agent space robot scenario described in Section 1, we only have a direct need for the belief states that result from fusion. We are only interested in the belief states of the original sources in as far as we want the fused belief state to reflect its informant history. An obvious question is whether it is possible to compute the belief state induced by the agents' fusion solely from their initial belief states, that is, without having to reference the belief states of their informant sources. This is highly desirable because of the expense of storing-or, as in the case of our space robot example, transmitting-all source belief states; we would like to represent each agent's knowledge as compactly as possible.
In fact, we can do this if all sources have equal rank. We simply take the transitive closure of the union of the agents' belief states: However, if sources are totally pre-ordered by credibility, we can still do much better than storing all the original sources. It is enough to store for each opinion of AGRRf (S) the rank of the highest-ranked source supporting it. We define pedigreed belief states which enrich belief states with this additional information:
Definition 22 Let A be an agent informed by a set of sources S ⊆ S. A's pedigreed belief state is a pair (≺, l) where ≺= AGRRf (S) and l :≺→ R such that l((x, y)) = max{rank(s) : x < s y, s ∈ S}. We use ≺ A r to denote the restriction of A's pedigreed belief state to r, that is, ≺ A r = {(x, y) ∈≺: l((x, y)) = r}.
We verify that a pair's label is, in fact, the rank of the source used to determine the pair's membership in AGRRf (S), not that of some higher-ranked source:
Proposition 19 Let A be an agent informed by a set of sources S ⊆ S and with pedigreed belief state (≺, l) . Then
The belief state induced by a pedigreed belief state (≺, l) is, obviously, the transitive closure of ≺.
Now, given only the pedigreed belief states of a set of agents, we can compute the new pedigreed belief state after fusion. We simply combine the labeled opinions using our refinement techniques. From the perspective of the induced belief states, we are essentially discarding unlabeled opinions (i.e., those derived by the closure operation) before fusion. Intuitively, we are learning new information so we may need to retract some of our inferred opinions. After fusion, we re-apply closure to complete the new belief state. Interestingly, in the special case where the sources are strictly-ranked, the closure is unnecessary: Figure 5 . In spite of this indistinguishability, if A = ∨ ({A 1 , A 2 }) and
Conclusion
We have described a semantically clean representation for aggregate beliefs which allows us to represent conflicting opinions without sacrificing the ability to make decisions. We have proposed an intuitive operator which takes advantage of this representation so that an agent can combine the belief states of a set of informant sources totally pre-ordered by credibility. Finally, we have described a mechanism for fusing the belief states of different agents which iterates well.
The aggregation methods we have discussed here are just special cases of a more general framework based on voting. That is, we account not only for the ranking of the sources supporting or disagreeing with an opinion (i.e., the quality of support), but also the percentage of sources in each camp (the quantity of support). Such an extension allows for a much more refined approach to aggregation, one much closer to what humans often use in practice. Exploring this richer space is the subject of further research.
Another problem which deserves further study is developing a fuller understanding of the properties of the Bel, Agn, and Con operators and how they interrelate.
A Proofs
Proposition 1
1. The transitive closure of a modular relation is modular.
Every transitive relation is quasi-transitive.
(Sen 1986) Every quasi-transitive relation is acyclic.
Proof:
1. Suppose a relation ≤ over finite set Ω is modular, and ≤ + is the transitive closure of ≤. Suppose x, y, z ∈ Ω and x ≤ + y. Then there exist w 0 , . . . , w n such that x = w 0 ≤ · · · ≤ w n = y. Since ≤ is modular and w 0 ≤ w 1 , either w 0 ≤ z or z ≤ w 1 . In the former case, x = w 0 ≤ z, so x ≤ + z. In the latter case, z ≤ w 1 ≤ · · · w n = y, so z ≤ + y.
2. Suppose Ω is a finite set, x, y, z ∈ Ω, ≤ is a transitive relation over Ω, and < is its strict version. Suppose x < y and y < z. Then x ≤ y, y ≤ x, y ≤ z, and z ≤ y. x ≤ y and y ≤ z imply x ≤ z, and y ≤ z and y ≤ x imply z ≤ x, both by transitivity. So x < z.
Proof: See (Sen 1986).
Proposition 3 (Arrow 1963) There is no aggregation operator that satisfies restricted range, unrestricted domain, (weak) Pareto principle, independendence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.
Proof: See (Arrow 1963).
Proof: Let be a total, quasi-transitive, nontransitive relation. First, such a relation exits: if Ω = {a, b, c}, it is easily verified that the relation Ω × Ω \ {(b, a)} is total, quasi-transitive, but not transitive.
Suppose x y and y z but x z. By totality, z x, so z ≺ x. If x ≺ y, then z ≺ y by quasitransitivity, a contradiction. Thus, x ∼ y. Similarly, if y ≺ z, then y ≺ x, a contradiction, so y ∼ z. But z ≺ x, so x ∼ z. Therefore, ∼ is not transitive.
Proposition 5 Suppose a relation ≺ is transitive and ∼ is the corresponding agnosticism relation. Then ∼ is transitive iff ≺ is modular.
Proof: Suppose ∼ is transitive and suppose x ≺ z, x, y, z ∈ W. We prove by contradiction: Suppose x ≺ y and y ≺ z. By transitivity, z ≺ y and y ≺ x, so x ∼ y and y ∼ z. By assumption, x ∼ z, so x ≺ z, a contradiction.
Suppose, instead, ≺ is modular and suppose x ∼ y and y ∼ z, x, y, z ∈ W. Then x ≺ y, y ≺ x, y ≺ z, and z ≺ y. By modularity, x ≺ z and z ≺ x, so x ∼ z.
Proposition 6 The set of irreflexive relations in B is isomorphic to T and, in fact, equals T < .
Proof: Let x, y, z ∈ W. Suppose ≺∈ B is irreflexive. Let be defined as x y iff y ≺ x. We first show that ≺ is the strict version of . Suppose ≺ ′ is the strict version of . If x ≺ ′ y, then x y and y x, so x ≺ y. If, instead, x ≺ y, then y x. By totality, x y, so x ≺ ′ y.
We show that ∈ T . If x ≺ y then y x. Otherwise, x ≺ y. But since ≺ is irreflexive, y ≺ x (otherwise x ≺ x by transitivity), so x y and is total. Next, suppose x y and y z. Then y ≺ x and z ≺ y. By modularity, z ≺ x, so x z, so is transitive. Now suppose ∈ T and ≺ is its strict version. First we show that ≺ is modular. Suppose x ≺ y. Then x y and y x. Since is total, x z or z x. Suppose x z. Whether y z or y z, z x by transitivity. Suppose, instead, z x. Then z y and y z, both by transitivity. We conclude that x z and z x, or z y and y z, so x ≺ z or z ≺ y. Second, transitivity of ≺ follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the transitivity of . Finally, ≺ is irreflexive since it is asymmetric.
Proposition 7 ≺∈ B iff there is a partition
1. For every x ∈ W i and y ∈ W j , i = j implies i < j iff x ≺ y.
Every W i is either fully connected (w
Proof: We refer to the conditions in the proposition as conditions 1 and 2, respectively. We prove each direction of the proposition separately.
(=⇒) Suppose ≺∈ B, that is, ≺ is a modular and transitive relation over W. We use a series of definitions and lemmas to show that a partition of W exists satisfying conditions 1 and 2. We first define an equivalence relation by which we will partition W. Two elements will be equivalent if they "look the same" from the perspective of every element of W:
Definition 23 x ≡ y iff for every z ∈ W, x ≺ z iff y ≺ z and z ≺ x iff z ≺ y.
Lemma 7.1 ≡ is an equivalence relation over W.
Suppose x, y ∈ W and x ≡ y. Then for every z ∈ W, x ≺ z iff y ≺ z and z ≺ x iff z ≺ y. But then for every z ∈ W, y ≺ z iff x ≺ z and z ≺ y iff z ≺ x. Therefore, y ≡ x, so ≡ is symmetric.
Suppose x, y, z ∈ W, x ≡ y, and y ≡ z. Suppose further that w ∈ W. By definition of ≡, x ≺ w iff y ≺ w and w ≺ x iff w ≺ y, and y ≺ w iff z ≺ w and w ≺ y iff w ≺ z. Therefore, x ≺ w iff z ≺ w and w ≺ x iff w ≺ z. Since w is arbitrary, x ≡ z, so ≡ is transitive.
≡ partitions W into its equivalence classes. We use [w] to denote the equivalence class containing w, that is, the set {w ′ ∈ W : w ≡ w ′ }. Observe that two worlds in conflict always appear in the same equivalence class: Proof: Suppose x, y ∈ W and x∞y. Since [x] is an equivalence class, it suffices to show that y ∈ [x], that is, x ≡ y. Suppose z ∈ W. By transitivity, if x ≺ z, then y ≺ z; if y ≺ z, then x ≺ z; if z ≺ x, then z ≺ y; and, if z ≺ y then z ≺ x. Thus, x ≺ z iff y ≺ z and z ≺ x iff z ≺ y, and since z is arbitrary, x ≡ y.
We now define a total order over these equivalence classes:
Proof: Suppose x ≡ x ′ and y ≡ y ′ , x, x ′ , y, y ′ ∈ W. By the definition of ≡, for every z ∈ W, x ≺ z iff
Lemma 7.4 ≤ is a total order over the equivalence classes of W defined by ≡.
, respectively. Suppose x ≺ y and y ≺ x, and suppose z ∈ W. By modularity of ≺, x ≺ z implies y ≺ z, y ≺ z implies x ≺ z, z ≺ x implies z ≺ y, and z ≺ y implies z ≺ x, so x ≡ y. We name the members of the partition W 0 , . . . , W n such that W i ≤ W j iff i ≤ j, where n is an integer. Such a naming exists since every finite, totally ordered set is isomorphic to some finite prefix of the integers.
We now check that this partition satisfies the two conditions. For the first condition, suppose x ∈ W i , y ∈ W j , and i = j. We want to show that i < j iff
Finally, we show that each W i is either fully connected or fully disconnected. Suppose x, y, z ∈ W i so that x ≡ y ≡ z. It suffices to show that x ≺ x iff y ≺ z. By the definition of ≡, x ≺ x iff y ≺ x, and x ≺ x iff x ≺ z. Suppose x ≺ x. Then, y ≺ x and x ≺ z, so y ≺ z by transitivity of ≺. Suppose now, x ≺ x. Then, y ≺ x and x ≺ z, so y ≺ z by modularity of ≺.
(⇐=) Suppose W = W 0 , . . . , W n is a partition of W and ≺ is a relation over W satisfying the given conditions. We want to show that ≺ is modular and transitive. We first give the following lemma:
Lemma 7.5 Suppose W is a partition of W and ≺ is a relation over W satisfying condition 1. If
, and x ≺ y, then i ≤ j.
Proof: If i = j, we're done. Suppose i = j. Then, since x ≺ y, i < j by condition 1.
We now show ≺ is modular. Suppose x ∈ W i , y ∈ W j , and x ≺ y. Then i ≤ j by Lemma 7.5. Suppose z ∈ W k . Then i ≤ k or k ≤ j by the modularity of ≤. Suppose i < k or k < j. Then x ≺ z or z ≺ y by condition 1. Otherwise i = k = j, so x, y, z ∈ W i . Since x ≺ y, W i is fully connected by condition 2, so x ≺ z (and z ≺ y).
Finally, we show that ≺ is transitive. Suppose x ∈ W i , y ∈ W j , z ∈ W k , x ≺ y, and y ≺ z. By Lemma 7.5, i ≤ j and j ≤ k, so i ≤ k by the transitivity of ≤. Suppose i < k. Then x ≺ z by condition 1. Otherwise i = k = j, so x, y, z ∈ W i . Since x ≺ y, W i is fully connected by condition 2, so x ≺ z.
(END OF PROPOSITION 7 PROOF)
Proposition 8 T ⊂ B and is the set of reflexive relations in B.
Proof: We first show that T ⊂ B. Let ∈ T and x, y, z ∈ W. By definition, is transitive. Suppose x y. Since is total, x z or z x. If z x, then z y by transitivity, so is modular. On the other hand, the empty relation over W is modular and transitive, but not total and, consequently, not in T . Now we show that ≺∈ B is in T if and only if it is reflexive. If ≺∈ T , it is total, so it is reflexive. If, instead, ≺ is reflexive, then x ≺ x so, by modularity, x ≺ y or y ≺ x. Thus, ≺ is total. And, since ≺∈ B, it is transitive. x ≺ y. Then there is some s ∈ S such that x < s y. By assumption, < s is modular, so x < s z or z < s y. By the definition of U n(S), x ≺ z or z ≺ y, so ≺ is modular.
Suppose a, b, c ∈ W and S = {s 1 , s 2 } such that
Proof: The transitive closure of any relation is transitive. Since U n(S) is modular, the transitive closure of U n(S) is also modular by Proposition 1.
Proposition 13 If S ⊆ S and ⊒ S is a total order, then AGRRf (S) ∈ B.
Proof: We first prove that AGRRf (S) is modular. Note that the proof does not depend on ⊒ S being a total order.
Proof: Let ≺= AGRRf (S). Suppose x, y, z ∈ W and x ≺ y. Then there exists s ∈ S such that x < s y and, for every s
′′ z, and z < s ′′ y. We know such a source exists since, by modularity, x < s z or z < s y. Furthermore, since s ′ is a maximal rank such source, s ′ ⊒ s. We consider the four cases and show that, in each, either x ≺ z or z ≺ y: It remains to show that ≺ is transitive. Suppose x ≺ y and y ≺ z. Then there exists s 1 ∈ S such that x < s1 y and, for every s Suppose s 1 = s 2 (the case s 2 = s 1 is similar). Then y < s1 z and z < s1 y. By modularity, since x < s1 y and z < s1 y, x < s1 z. Let s ′ ∈ S and s ′ = s 1 . Then x < s ′ y and y < s ′ x. And, since s 1 = s 2 , s ′ = s 2 , so y <
Proof: By Proposition 12, ≺ r ∈ B for every r ∈ ranks(S). For convenience, we assume the existence of a "virtual" source s r corresponding to each ≺ r . Precisely, for each r ∈ ranks(S), assume there exists a source s r ∈ S such that < sr =≺ r and rank(s r ) = r, and let S ′ be the set of these sources. Then,
Since there is one source in S ′ per rank r, and since > is a total order over R, ⊒ S ′ is a total order. The result follows from Proposition 13.
Proposition 15 If S ⊆ S, then AGR(S) ∈ B.
Proof: By Lemma 13.1, AGRRf (S) is modular.
AGRRf (S)
+ is obviously transitive, and, by Proposition 1, it is modular as well.
If ⊒ S is fully connected, AGR(S) = AGRU n(S).
Proof:
1. Suppose ⊒ S is fully connected.
Then the second half of the definition of AGRRf is vacuously true so that AGRRf (S) simplifies to {(x, y) : ∃s ∈ S. x < s y}. But this is exactly s∈S < s , i.e., U n(S), so AGR(S) = AGRRf (S) + = U n(S) + = AGRU n(S).
2. Suppose ⊒ S is an total order. By Proposition 13, AGRRf (S) is transitive, so AGR(S) = AGRRf (S) + = AGRRf (S).
Proposition 17 Let S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } ⊆ S and AGR f (< s1 , . . . , < sn ) = AGR(S). AGR f satisfies (the modified versions of ) restricted range, unrestricted domain, Pareto principle, IIA, and non-dictatorship.
Restricted range: AGR f satisfies restricted range by Proposition 15.
Unrestricted domain: AGR f satisfies unrestricted domain by Definition 7.
Pareto principle: Suppose x < si y for all s i . In particular, x < s y where s is a maximal rank source of S. Since s is maximal, it is vacuously true that for every s ′ = s ∈ S, x < s y and y < s ′ x. Therefore, x ≺ y, so AGR f satisfies the Pareto principle.
First note that AGRRf satisfies IIA:
′ * y since Definition 13 only relies on the relative ranking of the sources and the relations between x and y in their belief states to determine the relation between x and y in the aggregated state.
Thus, IIA can only be disobeyed when the closure step of AGR introduces new opinions. (Note that IIA is satisfied when there are no sources of equal rank since, by Proposition 16, the closure step introduces no new opinions under these conditions.) However, these new opinions are only added between worlds already involved in a conflict, as the following two lemmas show: Lemma 17.2 Suppose S ⊆ S and ≺ * = AGRRf (S). For every integer n ≥ 2, if x, y ∈ W, x ≺ * y, there exist x 0 , . . . , x n ∈ W such that x = x 0 ≺ * · · · ≺ * x n = y, and n is the smallest integer such that this is true, then x n ≺ * · · · ≺ * x 0 .
Proof: Suppose x, y ∈ W, x ≺ * y, and there exist x 0 , . . . , x n ∈ W such that x = x 0 ≺ * · · · ≺ * x n = y, and n is the smallest integer such that this is true. Consider any triple x i−1 , x i , x i+1 , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. First, x i−1 ≺ * x i+1 , otherwise there would be a chain of shorter length than n between x and y. Now, since x i−1 ≺ * x i , there exists s 1 ∈ S such that x i−1 < s1 x i and, for all s ′ = s 1 ∈ S, x i−1 ≈ s ′ x i . Similarly, there exists s 2 ∈ S such that x i < s2 x i+1 and, for all s ′ = s 2 ∈ S, x i ≈ s ′ x i+1 . Thus, all sources with higher rank than max(s 1 , s 2 ) are agnostic with respect to x i−1 and x i+1 .
Suppose s 1 = s 2 . Then x i ≈ s1 x i+1 so, by transitivity, x i−1 < s1 x i+1 . But then x i−1 ≺ * x i+1 , a contradiction. Similarly, we derive a contradiction if s 2 ⊂ s 1 . Thus, s 1 ≡ s 2 . Now, since x i−1 ≺ * x i+1 and all sources with rank higher than s 1 and s 2 are agnostic with respect to x i−1 and x i+1 , x i−1 < s1 x i+1 . By modularity, x i+1 < s1 x i . Since s 1 ≡ s 2 , and all the sources with higher rank than s 2 are agnostic with respect to x i and x i+1 , x i+1 ≺ * x i . Similarly, x i < s2 x i−1 , so x i ≺ * x i−1 . Since i was chosen arbitrarily between 1 and n − 1, x n ≺ * · · · ≺ * x 0 . And, in fact, all the opinions between these worlds originate from sources of the same rank.
Lemma 17.3 Suppose S ⊆ S, ≺ * = AGRRf (S), ≺= AGR(S), and x ≺ * y for x, y ∈ W. If x ≺ y, then x∞y.
Proof: Suppose x ≺ * y. If x ≺ y, then there exist x 0 , . . . , x n such that x = x 0 ≺ * · · · ≺ * x n = y and n is the smallest positive integer such that this is true. Then, by Lemma 17.2, y = x n ≺ * · · · ≺ * x 0 = x, so y ≺ x and x∞y. Now, suppose x, y ∈ W, x < si y iff x < s ′ i y for all i, x ∞y, and x ∞ ′ y. We show that x ≺ y implies x ≺ ′ y (the other direction is identical). Suppose x ≺ y. Let ≺ * = AGRRf (S) and ≺ ′ * = AGRRf (S ′ ). Since x ∞y, x ≺ * y by Lemma 17.3. But then x ≺ ′ * y by Lemma 17.1, so x ≺ ′ y.
(END OF IIA SUB-PROOF)
Non-dictatorship: Suppose ⊒ S is fully connected and suppose x < si y and y < si x. Let s j be such that y < sj x. Then x ≺ y and y ≺ x, so s i is not a dictator. Therefore, x ≺
